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STRANGER THAN STRANGELOVE

**Dan Ellsberg on the
Nuclear Failsafe System**



**Vietnam
Today**

**The History
of a Colony**

Daniel Ellsberg was the featured participant in a November 4 press conference in New York City to announce the Spring disarmament actions being planned around the United Nations Special Conference on Disarmament sponsored by the Mobilization for Survival. At the press conference, Ellsberg dwelt at length on his investigations into the delegation of authority by three Presidents to lower ranking military officers to initiate nuclear warfare under certain circumstances. The following statement is adapted from his comments.

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The Atomic Energy Act specifies that the President of the United States shall have the sole authority to use nuclear weapons. Virtually every president since then has assured us, at one occasion or another, that he interpreted that law as precluding him from delegating that authority under any circumstances whatever to field commanders. Under no circumstances did he propose to give any lower commander of whatever rank the right to make that decision to launch World War II, thermonuclear war.

In other words, the so-called devolution of authority in case the President was incapacitated is provided for to civilian authority. At least three of those presidents, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, to my knowledge deceived us. Harry Truman told us that the reason he guarded that sole authority very cautiously while he lived was that he didn't want some dashing shave-tail lieutenant, on his own best judgment, to take it on himself to start World War III.

But General Eisenhower, as President, in 1957 secretly delegated that power to some of his unified and specified commanders under certain limited conditions, conditions that could well arise in that time, such as communication breakdown and serious risk or the imminence of war.

He didn't submit that decision to the American people; in fact, he told them the contrary. They might have supported it; there was some good reason for that delegation. What he did not and could not have known were the results of that delegation in terms of risks to all humanity through the imitation of that delegation at every level of command. What I found in my researches for the Commander in Chief-Pacific (CINCPAC), Harry Felt, in the Pacific in '59 and '60, and reported in Washington in '60 and '61, was that levels of command

down to the level of major in a dusty airfield in Korea and up to the commander of the Seventh Fleet and everyone in between knew of that delegation, although the American public did not know. The officers believed that the delegation could be imitated on their level for the same reasons, to assure that nuclear forces would execute their warplans if it seemed appropriate to do so, even against written orders which made them stay until they received an order from the President. This is particularly dangerous in the Pacific where communications were out for natural reasons a great deal.

When I reported this in '61, I discovered that President Kennedy did not know of this delegation and in fact it was extremely difficult to confirm that it had occurred under Eisenhower. Although I was designated by McGeorge Bundy, the assistant to the President, to pin this down I didn't fully succeed. But after six months, Carl Kasper, deputy under McGeorge Bundy, did determine that there had been such a delegation and informed me that Kennedy had renewed it, rather than reverse the decision of his predecessor, the great general. Later, it was renewed by President Johnson. I don't know what the situation was in the later Johnson years or under Presidents Nixon or Carter; it may well have changed.

I would guess that President Carter has changed this situation. But I doubt very much that he himself knows, without the most intense investigation of the actual conditions, whether his written orders, if he has changed them, are being obeyed by sincere, patriotic officers down below. In light of things as I know them from my own Marine Corps experience, officers often understand that they must use their own judgment for the good of the country, except that here is a situation involving thermonuclear weapons, more firepower than World War II. In short, whatever Jimmy Carter knows he has ordered the generals, he doesn't know how the majors are interpreting it.

There are not to my knowledge any more locks on

Daniel Ellsberg is a scholar and an activist against nuclear weapons. He is currently speaking around the country in conjunction with teach-ins sponsored by the Mobilization for Survival.

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Dan Ellsberg on the Nuclear Failsafe System

those weapons now in the field of bombers, Strategic Air Command (SAC) bombers, Polaris submarines, or Tactical Air Command (TAC) than there were before.

There are provisions that require more than one person to make "go" decisions to turn locks, but that still delegates the decision to the lower level of command, whether it's two people, or 10 people who have to make it.

I don't think the dangers have ever been appreciated by the higher levels, and that's why the public has to act democratically now to insist that Congress join this dialogue which has so far been limited to the President and the military and inform the public.

Specifically, in '59, '60 and '61, it was my job to investigate command control procedures throughout the Pacific and in Washington. What I found then was a hair trigger system extremely prone to accident or unauthorized action of the kind portrayed in the movie *Dr. Strangelove*. It was a system with a thousand triggers and no stop switch because in those days the emphasis was so much on assuring a "go" that there was no "stop" if the "go" were incorrect.

To confirm this, I spoke with people at the level of CINCPAC himself, Harry D. Felt, Admiral Kivett, the Vice-admiral who was in charge of the 7th Fleet, Vice-admiral Eckstrom who was his air commander, and their atomic control officers. And at the lowest level of command, I spoke to a major in Kunsan, Korea, to confirm that at every level, people felt that, contrary to their written orders, they might have to do what they were physically capable of doing: send their planes off into the air despite the risk that there would be an accident that could throw off communications for everyone during an alert and give everyone the impression that they too should execute their warplans.

As I say, this condition persisted under Kennedy. In 1964, at last, what amounted to a major public referendum was held on this issue for the first time. Senator (and General) Goldwater, the

Republican candidate, made it an issue by proposing that the President give this authority to field commanders, like CINCEUR, our commander in Europe, or CINCSAC. President Johnson responded that this was irresponsible and against the law, both of which, most Americans would agree it was. But Johnson had already carried out that proposal and knew it, almost surely, since his advisors were the people who had instituted this decision. Secretaries of Defense Gates and McElroy certainly had informed him that their boss, Eisenhower, had made this decision. And if they hadn't informed him, that's not reassuring either. Goldwater has now told us that he knew that Kennedy had made this delegation; I read that in the paper today. He didn't tell us that at the time, nor of course did my boss, President Johnson.

And so the public voted overwhelmingly on the campaign issue of nuclear responsibility against the Goldwater interpretation and for the Truman interpretation of the Atomic Energy Act. But what they got was the Goldwater policy in the form of the Eisenhower/Kennedy/Johnson policy.

There is an alarming similarity between this issue and the second major issue of the campaign with which I was very closely involved, the bombing policy. Goldwater proposed to the public that we bomb North Vietnam. Johnson called that irresponsible and immature militarism and again the public voted overwhelmingly against the Goldwater proposal. And again what they got was the Goldwater proposal, because as I know, and I didn't tell I'm sorry to say, and as Johnson knew, all of his civilian advisors were proposing that very same thing and planning to carry it out. I met with William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy's brother, in the State Department on election day to consider alternative forms of the Goldwater bombing policies. We didn't wait until the day after the election because we thought people would vote against it, as they did. In short, democracy wasn't working in 1964. And it's never worked in the area of nuclear control because the public has been kept

ignorant by the secrecy system. Secrecy is surely as well justified in this area as in any other in history; that was obvious to me when I was part of that system. But it's also obvious to me now what the costs to democracy and to our survival have been of subverting democracy by allowing that secrecy, even in this area. That is why I'm speaking out now.

About 25 years ago, President Eisenhower considered informing the public, before the UN General Assembly, on the risks of thermonuclear weapons, an age we were just entering by our nuclear tests. He was going to give a speech and the planning for that speech was called "Operation Candor." It was shelved because he thought it would frighten the public too much. Instead he gave a speech called "Atoms for Peace," which led directly to the proliferation and legitimization of nuclear energy and nuclear reactors all over the world.

The offspring of that speech are the nuclear reactors that, according to President Ford, are going to give us 40 nuclear nations by 1985 and 100 by 1995. Every one of them will have the command control problems that I've described here and many others probably worse than ours. Humanity's fate depends on every one of them, which is why the goal of this Mobilization is to take very seriously Jimmy Carter's campaign goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons. The way to get there is to go down and not up as Carter is proposing. But it's also to look at a whole new dimension of the problem and to inform ourselves of the nature of the risks that these weapons pose.

I'm certain that President Carter, like his predecessors, is not yet really aware of those risks and he won't be unless the public demands it. This Mobilization is trying to evoke, and is evoking on 200 campuses around the country, the overdue public discussion of these matters so that true civilian control can be realized. I mean civilian control not in terms of militarized, "cleared" civilians who talk mainly to the military and each other as I did for 15 years, but people with a different sense of what risks to take with the future of all children on earth.

Understand that whatever orders Jimmy Carter has given, unless he has changed the *physical* controls of the system, as opposed to the written administrative controls, there aren't any physical controls. That's the change that would have to be made.

I wrote the guidelines for the US Nuclear Strategic Warplan in 1961 for the years '62 and '63, and, unless things have changed, no weapon assigned to that warplan has a physical lock on it that would keep the people at that level of command from using that weapon if they thought their duty demanded it—or if they were crazy or for some other reason. But craziness is not the most immediate and serious problem. Misunderstanding and misguided judgment by one of the thousands of people is much more serious. Specifically (I was not giving a hypothetical example), I am referring to a particular major in

Kunsan, Korea who had on his little airstrip, closer to Communist territory than any airstrip in the world, minutes flying time from North Korea and Manchuria, 10 F-100's, each of which had underslung a 1.1 megaton weapon. This kind of weapon was not meant to be carried underslung, because it was not what was called 3 point safe, it had too high a risk of going off if it was dropped or if there was an accident. Now 1.1 megatons is about one half the tonnage of World War II, which was 2 million tons. He had under his command, in that little strip in front of us, ten of those, the equivalent of five World War II's.

He told me what his orders were and if Jimmy Carter were to ask his counterpart today what his orders were, I'm sure he'd get the same answer—"I can't alert those planes, even for their safeguarding; I can't let them take off, let alone execute without direct orders" (in those days from Osan, his higher base, or Kadena in Okinawa, or possibly Tokyo). That's what the orders were then and they're probably the same now. The reason for those orders was that if he, on his own judgment, merely safeguarded his planes by having them take off (which other people did do more or less routinely), his weapons might go off. And if his weapons went off, all communications would go out in that area and the last thing that people would know there is that in the course of an alert, either a false alarm or a real war, a thermonuclear explosion had just gone off on one of our bases. Their belief that the war was on and that they would get no further messages, including execute messages, would then follow. So, if there were an accident anywhere in the Pacific which would've led such an alert to happen, there'd probably be a second accident very shortly and maybe others would follow and then what...? And so I asked the major, "quite aside from accidents, what would you do about your orders?" And since I had authority from Admiral Felt, he answered me. He said, "despite my orders, I'm the commander of this base. It is the oldest principle of war that a commander has the right and authority to protect his troops. If I thought my troops were in danger, for example, if I heard of an accident, that is, an explosion, somewhere else in the Pacific during an alert, I would send them off." And then I said, "and what do you think they would do?" He said, "well, again, you know what the orders are. They would go to a rendezvous area, reconnoiter, circle, until they got an execute order to carry out their plans, and if they did not get an execute order, they would return. Those are their orders." And I said, "and how would that work?" He said, "I think they'd come back, I think most of them would. Of course, if one of them broke out of that circle and headed for his target, I think the others would follow, and they might as well," he said very philosophically, "because if they go, we might as well all go."

That's a line from the movie *Dr. Strangelove*, actually, so when I saw that movie I recognized it as a documentary, for all its black humor, a documentary that could actually happen.

I came back and reported this. By the way, that



Daniel Ellsberg & Grape Palley



drawing by Peg Averill

major never spoke of the delegation of power. He just said, without claiming any delegation, that he had this understanding about what he would do under certain circumstances.

Now, atomic control officers on the Seventh Fleet and in CINCPAC at Oahu Camp Smith in Hawaii told me flatly that Felt had that delegation and that, in fact, it had been given downwards. They didn't say how far down and they probably didn't know how far down.

McGeorge Bundy, after I told him about this, appointed me, in the spring of '61, to be the White House Department of Defense representative to uncover the facts on this delegation of authority. I interviewed, first of all, Taswel Shepherd, a commander who was the President's naval aid and in charge of all "go" codes. He said, "I know of no such delegation and I'm sure I would have to know." This was about three months into the Kennedy Administration. I went to the underground command post at Camp David and spoke to the control officers there and looked at their files. I went to the underground command post for our officers in case of alert at High Point in Virginia and looked at their control procedures. I reported finally that there persisted a discrepancy. People in the field were sure there was such a delegation. I was assured no one knew of it. I'd gone as far as I could go.

Carl Kessen, to whom I reported, found out a month later that there existed a black book, which he showed me, of signed letters from President Eisenhower to the unified and specified commanders giving conditions under which they could

go. I wondered, were all these people lying to me? Who knows? They may have been lying, I don't think they were actually, or they may not have known. Taswel Shepherd swore to me later that he had not known. So I said to Kessen, "well, what did Kennedy do?" "He signed new orders." And of course my dismay about that was not the thought that even an Al Haig as CINCEUR in Europe, might have this authority. My thought, based on my experience in the military, and anyone who has been in the military I think will reach the same conclusion, was that inevitably majors in the field would be determining what is reasonable to do in the way of risk to take.

We have been much closer to nuclear war than the public has ever been led to believe, although the evidence has come out one way or another, and usually in the form of memoirs. From General Westmoreland's memoir we finally discovered that he seriously considered using nuclear weapons in the defense of Khe Sanh. I knew that at the White House end in 1968, although the public has never been told that officially. Roger Morris's book on Henry Kissinger tells us about a plan, the code name for which was Duck Hoop, for the escalation of the war in 1969, one year after the election of '68, the "end the war" election. In this plan, the military recommended to the President that we use nuclear weapons first in Vietnam against bases that stored material. I have spoken directly to Morris and to others in Kissinger's office who read the plan who told me in detail the nature of that nuclear targeting. The American public was never told.

A third situation which is more directly related to what I've been talking about is this. Take the accident problem. One might well ask, how could reasonable men, and these were reasonable conscientious men, have ever let such a situation come to be. The answer is that throughout the period I was working on this, the entire system was dominated by a single belief that the Soviets would get from 100 to 300 missiles by '59, '60 or '61, with which they could threaten every US SAC base and put our communications out of order. Now that was something genuinely to worry about. It was a real possibility. The military did not even consider however, the possibility that the Russians might not do that, which proved to be the case. Nor did they really consider the actual risks of what we were doing. This proves to me that, since I don't think we're going to get better Presidents than General Eisenhower on this matter, or even Presidents Kennedy, or Johnson, that leaving it to them and to the military alone just doesn't protect our interests in this.

I'll tell you something that's not ever been revealed because you'll see why I think the public has a need to know on these questions. This has always been regarded as higher than top secret but it's history, and I think it's history that really tells us where we've gotten to.

It's well known that the Russians in '60 and '61 did not build as many ICBM's in Russia as we'd estimated, which was 100, 200, 300 going toward a thousand. The usual figure given for the reduced estimate of what they had is about 50. Now 50 is less than 150 but it's still enough for every retaliatory target in the US. That's two for every SAC base.

But the Russians didn't have 50. They had four. Four. That figure has never been released anywhere. I'll leave it to you to decide why it's never been released. But it has nothing to do with our national security. We were wrong by a factor of more than ten from even that reduced estimate, let alone the other. In other words, the Russians had close to no missiles.

I think the reason for not pressing that piece of history upon the American public is that it reveals that the greatest and essentially the only threat to our national security and survival in 1961 was our own nuclear forces, the forces that we had built in expectation of the Russian build-up. But the pity of it goes beyond wasted money and forces. It goes to wasted opportunities for arms control and for comprehensive test bans offered as early as '56 by Adlai Stevenson. And it led us to do a very dangerous thing, something that would only be justified if we were almost certain that the Russians really threatened us and that was to put B-52's, flying in the air, with up to 24 megaton weapons aboard. Anyone in SAC can tell you that some of them are going to fall out of the air with their weapons, and they did. Several B-52's collided. Others fell for other reasons. Bombs fell on the United States of America and in every case, some of the safety devices for those bombs failed; sometimes two out of three, or three out of four. If all

four had failed as a result of this situation, more firepower would have been exploded on the US by our own weapon than in all the wars of human history put together. That's the risk our President was taking for us in secret without any public discussion.

Kennedy was led by his military advisors, during the Cuban Missile crisis of 1962, to put B-52's on the civilian runways of the biggest urban areas of the country; Boston and New York had B-52's with megaton weapons aboard. That was a risk, on the first instance, of killing more people than in any war in history, and of leading to an exchange that would wipe this country out and end humanity.

The fact that we haven't yet ended all life on earth with the weapons we built that are capable of doing this is only a beginning of the estimate of whether we've been adequately prudent.

In my own estimate, we've been lucky but very unwise, and we should change what we do. I've always thought that the crucial danger was not the irrational or the insane person as in *Dr. Strangelove*, although that is a real danger, but the highly dedicated, disciplined officer who might feel, in a certain situation, that his duty compelled him to do what his superiors would want him to do but couldn't order because they were dead or out of communication. Why didn't that come about?

The answer is that the conditions I premise, a genuine risk of attack by the Russians didn't happen because the Russians didn't have any weapons. Increasingly the military knew that talk of crises was something like a hoax. The Russians didn't, in '61, have the capability.

Now, in '62 they began to have the capability. By '67, they did have the capability and so crisis now has a kind of compelling quality to it that makes the whole situation far more dangerous.

The '73 alert was a very different world — the Russians have now built enough to destroy all life on earth just as we have. What's their command control capability like? I don't know and we should care.

I told all of this information to Clement Zablocki, who had just held hearings on this subject in '76 and had gotten false information. He had been told by a government representative that there had never been any such delegation. This man, an admiral, may have been telling the truth; he may not have known the truth. So I told Zablocki the true situation. Zablocki said "How do we know the Russian system is any better?" I said, we don't. That means the situation is at least twice as bad as I've been describing. And we don't know what the Brazilians' system will be, or the Israeli's, when they get it, or the British, or the French, or the Chinese. Each multiplies the problem.

I find a lot of people have seen *Dr. Strangelove* so they're familiar with this. The President, Peter Sellers, says, having been told that there were planes on their way to the Soviet Union, "Get them back." He's told by the chief of staff of the Air Force, Buck Turgeson, George Scott, "We can't

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get them back." The President says, "What do you mean 'we can't get them back?'" The General says, "Mr. President, we briefed you on this situation a year ago and you made the decision. If we put a stop code which will be recognized as an authentic order coming from the White House in the envelope or in the system for these people, the Russians might get it—balancing of risks—and they could paralyze our retaliation. Therefore there is no stop authenticator, there is no message they will obey that says stop."

The President is kind of disturbed by this, as no doubt he would be.

That was the situation in 1959, '60 and '61, there was no stop code and the reason was precisely the one given by George Scott in that movie. Obviously the writers of the movie had somebody who knew these operations.

President Kennedy didn't know this for six months, so asking the President isn't the conclusive way to reveal this. But, there's probably 10,000 people in this country along with me who do know it. My experience would tell me that every person who's served in a control booth, every person who's been on a strip like Osan or Kunsan, or a Polaris submarine, or a cruiser knows perfectly well how to beat this system. It's an intellectual puzzle that turns out to be not very hard to solve. I think the time has come for them to save their country by telling their Congressperson to find out about it and tell them and journalists what they know.

By the way, recently a SAC major was almost courtmartialed because he demanded evidence that the message he might get to launch an attack would, in fact, be coming from the President. They said he had no need to know. And under those conditions he said he would not go, although if he were sure it was from the President he would go. Rather than assure him on that point, they threatened to court martial him and then let him resign. Well, he did have a need to know and we have a need to know.

The Russians built four ICBM's in 1960, and that's exactly all they had until early '62. In 1962, it was pinned down that the number of SS6's they actually had built was four. And that we had been taking all these risks and renewing them because of that. The President did not announce the new intelligence estimate but did announce, finally, his decision on the size of our Minuteman program which was taken after the new estimate. He decided on a thousand new missiles. In the face of four Russian ICBMs.

The reasons for that program may have been very good ones and I don't know what they were; but they were not a fear that we were behind the Russians any more than I think current decisions on cruise missiles, Trident, Missile X and the neutron bomb have to do with the fear that we are significantly behind.

The Mobilization thinks that the word abolition, which currently has an almost impossibly naive

romantic sound to it, even though Jimmy Carter uses it, should be taken very seriously as a goal. It's been 20 years like this, but you don't have to have lived the life I have to know that nuclear weapons are not compatible with human life.

The direct offshoot of the "Atoms for Peace" program, the atoms are good for you program, is the spread of reactors all over the place. They're going to Brazil and Iran. The "Atoms for Peace" program was the second greatest threat to our security, aside from the weapons that the atoms for peace were meant to legitimize. So, the risks of this situation have always been the greatest to our own country. The secrecy system that preserves these risks by limiting the decision-making to people who are not capable of choosing the way we would is a direct threat to the national security of this country, and to the survival of all the humans on the earth.

The first thing to be done is eschew new weapons, like the neutron bomb, which is only for first use. My Rand background tells me that right away, so I give it as a piece of free analysis to the Administration, in case they haven't noticed it. A neutron bomb is not something you would use after somebody else has used a dirty radioactive weapon and the environment is already contaminated for 25,000 years and the buildings already blown away.

I don't know what the Russian system is like. I hope that they have given their field commanders orders not to use nuclear weapons, at least not without orders from Moscow. I don't know if they have put locks on their weapons, and I can only hope they have. The "go" code would then be the combination to the lock. We haven't done it, and I doubt the Russians have done it either. What they have done, according to what I read in the paper, is distributed those weapons down to their divisions.

Now the government talks about using neutron bombs against a Russian tank attack. The neutron bomb has the peculiar characteristic of causing certain death in horrible agony during a period from six days to six weeks. Over that period of time, the victims are still operational. Those are very angry people, and, if armed with nuclear weapons, they're fantastically dangerous people. Russian divisions are armed with nuclear weapons. To make walking dead men of Russians armed with nuclear weapons seems to be a quite imprudent thing to do. I would not rely on Russian orders not to use the weapons on cities in revenge being obeyed by those troops; not after what had just been done to them. I hope their weapons have locks, but I wouldn't even count on that. We're not going to use those weapons against Russians. We're not that thoughtless. We're going to use them against people who don't have nuclear weapons.

This just illustrates how the problems of commandant control have been ignored throughout. I have been telling Congress this for six years. Of course, I told Presidents first for years. They talked

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days when, as author Peter Golenbock states, "rooting for the Yankees was like rooting for US Steel" will be disappointed. This is not a rewrite of Jim Bouton's *Ball Four*, nor is it a hype vanity work designed to build up the Yankees into larger-than-life characters.

Golenbock crisscrossed the country many times to talk to former Yankees: superstars whose bubblegum cards were coveted by youngsters, as well as players who were flashes in the pan, for whom the Yankees were but one brief stop in a mediocre and undistinguished career. The highs, the lows, the quarrels, and the humor of life as a Yankee during these years is sensitively and realistically depicted in this book. That alone assures it a niche among the few quality sports works on the market these days.

A portrayal of these glory days would not be complete, however, without addressing the oppressive and high-handed manner in which the front office administrators operated during that time. An absolute arrogance and lack of respect for the players is revealed by such moves as the trading of star pitcher Vic Raschi in the early '50s when he demanded a raise after a 20 victory season or the release of veteran star shortstop Phil Rizzuto with no warning after years of loyal service on, ironically, Old-Timers Day. For all the wealth accumulated during those 16 seasons, the Yankee owners were notoriously cheap in cutting the players in for a fair share of the take. In addition, they demanded total conformity with the clean cut Middle American image which the ownership sought to cultivate. Frankly, if you were a bit of a flake and somewhat rambunctious in demeanor, your days as a Yankee were numbered unless you happened to be a star the likes of Mickey Mantle or Whitey Ford.

Most serious, however, was the racism of the Yankee management. Although Jackie Robinson had broken the color barrier when he signed with the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1947 and a plethora of Black prospects awaited big league trials, only a handful of major league clubs rushed to sign Black players. The

Yankees, under General Manager George Weiss, were among the last to bring in Black players. Weiss, a conservative man, had been in baseball since 1920, and saw no need for change. "I will never allow a Black man to wear a Yankee uniform," he proclaimed once at a cocktail party after one drink too many. "Boxholders from Westchester don't want that sort of crowd. They would be offended to have to sit with niggers."

When sober, however, Weiss practice more subtlety. He averred that the reason there were no Black Yankees was that "none were quality enough to wear Yankee pinstripes" — a devious and racist rationale that unfortunately haunts us even today as Blacks (and other minorities and women) seek choice jobs. Eventually, liberal and civil rights pressures forced the Yanks to sign a number of Black players (although in the interim they rejected a strapping slugger from Birmingham, Alabama — Willie Mays) and Elston Howard became the first Black Yankee in 1955. Weiss would no doubt be disconcerted today, were he still living, to see this year's champion starting lineup: more than two-thirds Black, a measure of substantial progress since his time.

Today the Yankees again reign as world champions after a dozen mediocre years, wandering in the wilderness. Once again baseball fans across the country are sowing sour grapes as in the old "break up the Yankees" days of the 1950s. George Steinbrenner, the Yankee owner who was suspended from baseball for two years for illegal contributions to the 1972 Nixon campaign, has paid a king's ransom to buy up the league's best players, say the critics. Although quite true, Golenbock points out in his introduction that: "We diehard Yankee fans don't care how we win games and pennants as long as we win them."

I do plead guilty to such sentiment and readily confess my love for baseball, that cultural institution so near and dear to the hearts of millions of Americans.

—Patrick Lacefield

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to the military and ran into heat and trouble on this problem. So they stopped and the locks didn't get put on. These so-called permissive action links (PALS), which Goldwater spoke out against years ago, were never put on. They were not put on US bombers, TAC, SAC or Polaris.

In 1971, the same time as I released the Pentagon Papers, I began to urge Congresspeople, starting with a handful of Senators, including Ervin, Fulbright, Gravel and Symington, to have hearings on this question. And they seemed very interested. Only Congress can subpoena witnesses and get the testimony which even a President has

trouble getting. This is what I tried to do with the Pentagon Papers for two years, with failure. I didn't get them in either case for the same reason. Congress didn't want to fight the executive or the military on this, despite the urgency of the problem. The public didn't care, they said. And I finally figured out that the public doesn't care because they don't know there's a problem. So after two years I put out the Pentagon Papers in the hopes of stopping the bombs that were actually falling.

Now, after several years of actively talking to Congress on this issue, I've finally decided that Congress will not do what has to be done, which is to fight the military for the truth, not be content with lies, not be content with no comment.

We'll never get to the truth unless an informed public demands it. That's how the Vietnam War was finally ended. And that is what the Mobilization for Survival is setting out to do.